China’s One-Child Policy Threatens Economic Ambitions
An expert says China's one-child rule shrank its people and spending so it may never overtake the US Luke Michael/Unsplash

China's one-child policy could have lasting consequences for its economic ambitions, according to demographer Yi Fuxian. The University of Wisconsin-Madison researcher argues that decades of birth restrictions contributed to a demographic crisis that could weaken growth and domestic consumption.

China introduced its one-child policy in 1979 amid official concerns about rapid population growth. Authorities later relaxed the restrictions, allowing two children from 2016 and three from 2021. However, fertility remains low, while the population is ageing and shrinking.

The economic implications are significant. The International Monetary Fund's April 2026 projections put China's nominal gross domestic product at approximately $20.85 trillion (£15.62 trillion), compared with $32.38 trillion (£24.25 trillion) for the United States. Whether China can close that gap will depend on several factors, including productivity, investment, consumer spending and demographic change.

The New York Post reported Yi's arguments on 27 October 2026. His estimates challenge official Chinese population figures, but they remain disputed and should not be treated as established facts.

The One-Child Policy and China's Demographic Challenge

China's National Bureau of Statistics reported a population of approximately 1.405 billion at the end of 2025. Its official figures also recorded 7.92 million births that year, while deaths reached 11.31 million. The resulting natural population decline highlights the demographic pressures facing the country.

Yi argues that the population decline began earlier than official figures indicate. He estimates that China had fewer than 1.28 billion people in 2020, substantially below the government's reported total. However, the supplied interview does not establish an independently verified basis for replacing official figures with his estimate.

His argument also extends to fertility. Yi puts China's fertility rate at approximately 0.8 births per woman, well below the replacement level of about 2.1. That estimate requires careful attribution because the article does not provide enough methodological detail to independently verify it.

The distinction matters because fewer births can eventually reduce the number of working-age adults and consumers. An ageing population can also increase pressure on pension systems, healthcare services and families supporting older relatives.

Why Demographic Change Could Affect Economic Growth

Yi argues that China's economic model has relied too heavily on manufacturing exports, property investment and state-backed industrial expansion. He links these trends to weak household consumption, although the supplied material does not establish that demographic policy alone caused them.

China's official statistics show that its economy continued to grow in 2025. The National Bureau of Statistics reported annual GDP growth of 5 per cent, alongside a population decline. These figures illustrate why demographic challenges should not be confused with evidence that economic growth has stopped.

The longer-term concern is whether a smaller workforce can sustain productivity and economic expansion. Investment in automation, education and technology could help offset some labour shortages. However, the extent to which these measures can compensate for low fertility remains uncertain.

Yi predicts that China could fall further behind the United States across major demographic and economic measures. His assessment is one possible outlook, rather than proof that China will never overtake the American economy.

The central issue is therefore not simply how many people China has. It is whether productivity, household spending and economic reforms can offset the effects of an ageing population. The legacy of the one-child policy may complicate that challenge, but it cannot determine the outcome on its own.