Police Could Use Nationwide License Plate Cameras to Track Women Travelling for Abortions, Flock Safety Official Admits

Police could potentially use nationwide licence plate camera networks to trace women travelling across state lines for abortions, a Flock Safety executive acknowledged during a hearing in New York, highlighting a privacy risk that extends beyond the states where the cameras are installed.

Trevor Chandler, Flock Safety's senior director of public affairs, faced questions from Suffolk County legislators on 8 October about the company's network of automated licence plate readers. The discussion focused on whether police can reconstruct vehicle movements over time and how safeguards restrict searches linked to reproductive healthcare.

The issue is not whether a camera can establish that someone had an abortion. It cannot. Rather, vehicle sightings collected at different locations can create a searchable record of movements, potentially giving investigators leads about where someone has travelled.

How Cross-State Searches Can Expose Private Journeys

Flock Safety's automated licence plate readers capture vehicle images and registration details, which authorised law enforcement users can search across participating networks. When agencies share data, a query may extend beyond the jurisdiction where a vehicle was first recorded.

That reach can help police investigate stolen vehicles, serious offences, and missing-person cases. It also raises concerns when searches involve healthcare that is lawful in one state but restricted in another.

A Texas investigation illustrates the stakes. Records examined by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) showed that Johnson County Sheriff's Office personnel conducted a search spanning more than 83,000 cameras across 6,809 networks while investigating a woman who had taken abortion medication. The search included cameras in states where abortion remained legal. The records described the matter as a death investigation involving a non-viable fetus.

The sheriff's office and Flock disputed earlier claims that the search targeted the woman for seeking reproductive healthcare, saying officers were concerned about her welfare after she was reported missing. EFF's review of police records and a detective's sworn affidavit raised questions about that explanation, including whether officers considered potential charges. The woman was not charged over taking the medication, according to the records reviewed by EFF.

The case demonstrates how a search initiated under one investigative purpose can bring sensitive healthcare information into view. It does not, by itself, establish that every cross-state search is intended to target abortion patients.

Flock's Safeguards Depend on Settings and Oversight

At the Suffolk County hearing, Chandler said New York agencies using Flock had reproductive-health search filters enabled. The company says its filters can block searches covered by restrictions where those controls are activated. It also says searches are logged and can be audited.

The protections are not necessarily uniform nationwide. In an update published on 13 October, Flock acknowledged that some California camera networks had been inadvertently accessible to out-of-state agencies during 2025. The company said earlier logging limitations meant it could not determine the cause of every reported instance. It announced stronger restrictions on interstate and federal access to California data, permanent logging of sharing-setting changes, and automatic blocking of reproductive-care-related searches in California. The company says such searches can be enabled elsewhere by an administrator.

These changes are significant, but they are the company's stated safeguards, not independent proof that every potential misuse has been eliminated. Their effectiveness depends on which controls agencies activate, how access is granted, and whether suspicious searches are investigated.

Why Data Access Is Becoming a Wider Privacy Issue

Flock says its technology is designed to identify vehicles rather than people. Yet repeated sightings of the same vehicle can reveal patterns, including visits to clinics or travel between states. The data does not prove why a person went somewhere, but it may provide information that investigators can use to build a case.

The debate therefore extends beyond abortion. It raises questions about how long location data is retained, which agencies can search it, and what checks exist when an officer's stated reason for a query is questionable.

Flock announced broader privacy and accountability measures in a separate policy update, including a recommended seven-day default retention period, offence-based restrictions on sharing, and stronger auditing tools. Existing customers may retain their current retention settings, and the company says local agencies continue to control access to their data.

For communities using the technology, the central challenge is balancing investigative value with clear limits on access. The Texas case and the California access problems show why written policies alone may not be enough: data-sharing settings, audit trails, and meaningful consequences for misuse are all part of the protection.