Trump Under Fire As Iran Talks Suggest Return To Pre-2018 Deal After Years Of Conflict Failed To Deliver Results

Eight years after Donald Trump tore up the Iran nuclear agreement and promised a better deal, the United States finds itself fighting a war against Iran while struggling to secure terms significantly stronger than the one it abandoned.

Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 8 May 2018, calling it 'a horrible one-sided deal' and imposing a 'maximum pressure' sanctions campaign on Tehran. The strategy was premised on the belief that economic pain would force Iran to accept far more sweeping concessions on its nuclear programme, ballistic missiles, and regional conduct.

Instead, Iran accelerated its uranium enrichment, reduced IAEA inspector access, and by December 2024 was enriching to levels approaching weapons-grade, according to the UN nuclear watchdog. As of 30 March 2026, the United States is engaged in an active military conflict with Iran and has yet to secure the comprehensive agreement Trump once promised.

The JCPOA That Trump Called 'The Worst Deal Ever'

The original JCPOA, signed on 14 July 2015 by Iran, the United States, China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, placed strict limits on Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. Under its terms, Iran dismantled roughly two-thirds of its installed centrifuges, capped its enriched uranium stockpile, and agreed to enhanced IAEA inspections. The International Atomic Energy Agency repeatedly confirmed Iran's compliance before the US withdrawal.

Trump's own administration certified Iran's compliance twice, in April and July 2017, before Trump decertified the agreement in October that year. The IAEA's verifications were consistent throughout. Senior officials, including then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joseph Dunford, told Congress in September 2017 that 'Iran is adhering to its JCPOA obligations' and that the agreement 'has delayed Iran's development of nuclear weapons.'

According to the Arms Control Association, the JCPOA barred Iran from producing highly enriched uranium through 2030 and imposed IAEA inspection requirements lasting between 10 and 25 years, with some permanent. Laura Rockwood, a senior fellow at the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, who worked for the IAEA for 28 years, said Iran 'simply would not have been able to enrich to the point of possessing over 400 kg of 60% enriched uranium had the JCPOA remained in place.'

How Maximum Pressure Backfired

After Trump's 2018 withdrawal, Iran methodically dismantled its JCPOA commitments. By July 2019, it had already exceeded limits on its low-enriched uranium stockpile. It subsequently reduced IAEA inspector access, expanded its centrifuge programme, and enriched uranium to 60% purity — far above the 3.67% ceiling set by the original deal and far closer to the 90% level needed for a nuclear weapon.

The Council on Foreign Relations notes that Iran's breakout time, the period it would need to produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb, collapsed from roughly one year under the JCPOA to a matter of weeks by early 2025, before the June 2025 Israeli and US strikes on its facilities. A Pew Research Centre survey found that 53% of the American public and 94% of US scholars in international relations disapproved of Trump's original withdrawal decision.

Rather than compelling Iran to accept tighter restrictions, the pressure campaign triggered exactly what its architects said they wanted to prevent. Writing in Arms Control Association's March 2026 issue, Daryl G. Kimball, the organisation's executive director, argued that 'Trump's negotiators are trying to address problems that had been addressed by the nuclear deal that Trump unilaterally abandoned in 2018.'

He added that renewed US military strikes on Iran 'would be counterproductive, reckless, and unjustified on nonproliferation grounds.'

The Geneva Talks And Their Collapse

In early 2026, with Iran's economy in freefall following UN snapback sanctions and large-scale domestic protests brutally repressed, the two sides returned to the table. Indirect talks were held in Muscat on 6 February, followed by further Omani-mediated sessions. But the gaps between the two positions remained vast. The Trump administration demanded Iran permanently and completely dismantle its uranium enrichment infrastructure, so-called 'zero enrichment,' as well as restrictions on its ballistic missile programme and an end to its support for regional armed factions.

Iran's position, detailed in reporting by Slate and WBUR's On Point programme, was to offer a suspension of enrichment for three years, limits on uranium purity to 1.5%, and IAEA verification, concessions Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, described as more far-reaching than anything Iran offered during the 2013 to 2015 negotiations that produced the original JCPOA. But the administration rejected them. Vaez told WBUR: 'Trump's perception of negotiations was Iranian capitulation. They were not looking for detailed technical negotiations that would take weeks or months. They were looking for a yes and no answer.' He concluded: 'They were seeking a surrender agreement.'

Multiple nuclear experts, including Elena Sokova, executive director of the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, criticised the administration for sending negotiators without nuclear technical expertise.

Witkoff and Kushner, per a senior Middle East diplomat with knowledge of the talks, chose not to include nuclear technical experts in the Geneva sessions and cancelled scheduled technical follow-up talks. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi later wrote that 'when complex nuclear negotiations are treated like a real estate transaction, and when big lies cloud realities, unrealistic expectations can never be met. The outcome? Bombing the negotiation table out of spite.'

As of late March 2026, the United States has submitted a 15-point ceasefire proposal to Iran via Pakistan, calling for a 30-day ceasefire, rollback of Iran's nuclear programme, limits on its missiles, and reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran rejected the proposal, calling it 'maximalist' and 'unreasonable,' and issued its own five-point counter-plan, which included Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, reparations for war damage, and a guarantee that the US and Israel would never attack Iran again.