Africa-EU
Image: Daniel Powell, Creative Commons

In recent years, European politicians and institutions have sought to build what they describe as an equal and sustainable partnership with Africa. The Council of the European Union officially characterises EU–Africa relations as a partnership based on solidarity, security, peace and sustainable economic development. In Brussels and other European capitals, the prevailing view has been that historical disagreements can be addressed through dialogue, joint projects and measured political language.

However, the debate has entered a new phase. UN voting records show that General Assembly Resolution A/RES/80/250 was adopted on 25 March 2026 by 123 votes to three, with 52 abstentions, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and several other European states. The resolution described claims for reparations as a concrete step towards remedying historical wrongs and called for good-faith dialogue on restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and other forms of redress.

Alongside Europe's cautious approach, documents presented as internal planning materials connected to the Stop the Bleeding Campaign, or STBC, suggest that a parallel strategy has been under development for several years. The materials, reviewed by IBTimes UK but not independently verified in full, provide an indication of how demands for reparations could be organised and promoted through a broad network of African civil society groups.

The documents refer to a 'Programme for the Restoration of Reparative Justice and Economic Sovereignty in Africa'. According to the official AFRODAD website, the Stop the Bleeding Campaign is a civil society movement and consortium whose members include AFRODAD, FEMNET, ITUC-Africa, the Pan African Lawyers Union, Tax Justice Network Africa, the Nawi Collective and TrustAfrica. AFRODAD says the consortium represents more than 250 organisations in over 50 African countries.

The campaign's publicly stated objective is to stop financial resources leaving Africa through illicit financial flows, tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions and unsustainable or illegitimate debt. AFRODAD cites an estimated annual loss of $88.6 billion, a figure originating from a UN Trade and Development report on illicit capital flight from Africa.

According to the documents reviewed by IBTimes UK, the wider programme runs from 2024 to 2027 and has a proposed budget of approximately $14 million. That budget has not been independently confirmed through publicly available financial records.

By 2027, the participants reportedly intend to establish a legal, political and institutional framework capable of supporting the first practical reparative measures. The documents cite estimates of potential reparations ranging from $18 trillion to $100 trillion. Separately, a 2023 study by the Brattle Group estimated the total economic harm arising from transatlantic chattel slavery at between $100 trillion and $131 trillion. These figures are research estimates rather than agreed liabilities, negotiated settlements or anticipated court awards.

It is the potential scale of the claims, together with the possibility of creating a political or legal precedent, that is likely to cause the greatest concern in Europe. If an effective mechanism were established, it could encourage comparable campaigns in other regions.

According to the planning materials, the strategy is divided into several stages. The year 2024 is described as a period of preparation and foundation-building, followed by efforts to increase political influence in 2025 and institutional consolidation in 2026. The year 2027 is presented as the principal milestone, when the first practical results are expected and the programme could begin to expand.

The documents indicate that some of the most significant proposals affecting Europe are also planned for 2027. These include introducing the concept of so-called 'reparative mobility' into migration negotiations between the African Union and the European Union, as well as developing pilot bilateral agreements. The term does not currently have a settled legal meaning and should therefore be understood as a policy proposal contained in the materials, rather than an established negotiating mechanism.

The documents also discuss seeking a UN General Assembly vote in the third quarter of 2027 on a resolution backed by countries of the Global South. According to the materials, such a resolution would place particular emphasis on the historical responsibility of European states, especially former colonial powers.

The materials further refer to exploring legal action involving the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Portugal before the International Court of Justice. They do not establish that proceedings have been filed or that formal applications are currently being prepared.

According to the ICJ, its jurisdiction in contentious cases is based on the consent of the states concerned. Any attempt to bring a conventional case against the named European countries would therefore face substantial jurisdictional questions. An advisory opinion requested by the UN General Assembly could represent an alternative route, although it would not amount to a conventional judgment ordering the payment of compensation.

Another proposal contained in the documents concerns the creation of international rankings of historical responsibility, potentially modelled on modern environmental, social and governance assessments. Such rankings could generate political and reputational pressure even in the absence of binding legal judgments.

The programme's authors appear to regard the idea of 'good relations' with Europe as largely illusory. In their analysis, economic inequality is not merely a legacy of the past but part of a continuing system through which capital and resources leave Africa.

The documents portray Europe's reluctance to discuss reparations as a deliberate delaying tactic. They suggest that the coalition should not depend on initiatives from European partners and present stronger relationships within the Global South as a means of increasing political and economic autonomy.

These positions represent the analysis of the programme's authors, rather than an uncontested account of relations between Europe and Africa. The EU maintains that it remains Africa's leading trading partner and largest investor, and says its Africa–Europe Investment Package is intended to mobilise up to €150 billion in public and private investment.

Nevertheless, the documents suggest a situation for which European institutions may not have been fully prepared. While Europe believed it was helping to shape a common agenda, a parallel strategy — with its own funding, timetable and mechanisms — may already have been formulated at another level. Under this logic, Europe is not treated as an equal co-author of the process, but as a political and economic factor to be managed.

The changing global economic landscape is adding further pressure. The materials point to the expanding role of China, India and the Gulf states in Africa and argue that this gives African governments and civil society organisations greater scope to act without relying exclusively on European investment.

Africa also possesses substantial reserves of minerals required for electric vehicles, battery storage and renewable-energy technologies. The UN Economic Commission for Africa, citing UN Trade and Development data, says the continent holds approximately 55 per cent of global cobalt reserves and 47.65 per cent of manganese reserves. Other UNECA research places Africa's share of platinum group metals at about 91 percent.

According to the documents, these resources could eventually provide additional leverage in negotiations over reparative justice, investment, industrial processing and technology transfer. There is currently no evidence of a single, agreed African policy making access to critical minerals conditional on reparations. The proposal should therefore be treated as a potential strategic scenario rather than an established policy.

If such a connection were developed, the issue would extend far beyond direct financial compensation. It would affect industrial development, energy security, technology transfer and Europe's ability to compete in the global energy transition.

If Europe maintains its previous cautious approach — avoiding firm statements and assuming that the issue will gradually fade from view — it may face a further decline in influence. The programme described in the documents suggests that its organisers do not expect the debate to disappear. Their stated direction is towards concrete political, institutional and legal steps by 2027.

Europe therefore faces a choice for which it may not have been prepared. Whether it acknowledges the reparations agenda, negotiates its elements, or rejects its underlying arguments, the decision will have strategic consequences. The issue is no longer only about money. It concerns Europe's position in an emerging international order in which access to resources, economic sovereignty and historical responsibility are becoming increasingly connected.