Donald Trump
PHOTO : AARON SCHWARTZ/SIPA UA/ ALAMY

While global attention has been fixed on the US-Iranian conflict, the Trump administration has quietly conducted 58 confirmed airstrikes in Somalia so far in 2026, a pace that threatens to shatter its own annual bombing record.

The figure, drawn exclusively from US Africa Command (AFRICOM) press releases, represents a continuation of what analysts at Washington-based think tank New America describe as the most dramatic escalation of the US air war in Somalia in American history.

Trump's administration launched 124 airstrikes in Somalia across 2025, nearly double the previous annual record of 63, which Trump himself set during his first term in 2019. If the current 2026 tempo holds, projections suggest the US could surpass 300 strikes in the country by year's end. Senior administration officials have not addressed the campaign in any public forum, and it has received virtually no coverage from mainstream US media outlets.

The 21 April Strike Near Kismayo and AFRICOM's Thinning Disclosures

The most recent confirmed strike in Somalia took place on 21 April 2026. AFRICOM's official press release states that the attack targeted al-Shabaab in the vicinity of Wadajir, approximately 90 kilometres southwest of the southern port city of Kismayo in Somalia's Jubaland region. The command provided no information on casualties, bomb type, or aircraft involved, a pattern that has defined nearly every public disclosure under the current administration.

That silence is deliberate. AFRICOM suspended sharing casualty assessments with reporters in the spring of 2025, stating at the time that it was 'temporarily refraining from publishing casualty estimates while the new administration finalises its policy.' Researchers at the West Point Combating Terrorism Centre noted that the pause has made independent verification of strike outcomes essentially impossible. The command also stopped responding to queries on assessed death tolls as a matter of policy.

Somalia
Six million Somalis or 40 percent of the population are facing extreme levels of food insecurity Photo: AFP / YASUYOSHI CHIBA

Antiwar.com, which has tracked every AFRICOM press release since the start of 2026, reported on 23 April that the Jubaland attack brought the confirmed 2026 total to at least 58 strikes. The qualifier 'at least' is significant: AFRICOM's press releases do not always capture every operation, and the Somali government has announced parallel operations against al-Shabaab for which no corresponding US announcement exists.

Pete Hegseth's January 2025 Directive and the Loosened Strike Framework

The surge did not happen by accident. Shortly after Trump returned to office in January 2025, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a directive that reversed Biden-era restrictions requiring White House approval for strikes conducted outside formally designated war zones. The policy shift handed AFRICOM commanders significantly broader authority to independently authorise attacks, including against targets beyond the command's conventional battlefield boundaries.

Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth
The White House, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

AFRICOM's then-commander General Michael Langley told the Senate in April 2025 that the expanded authorities gave the command 'the capability to hit them harder.' AFRICOM spokeswoman Kelly Callahan confirmed in a statement to Stars and Stripes that the directive directly corresponded with the uptick in strike frequency.

David Sterman, a senior policy analyst at New America, told Al Jazeera that there appeared to be 'a demand signal from the White House for escalation' alongside 'a willingness to allow more clearly offensive uses of strikes with less scrutiny and regulation.'

The shift also expanded the pool of people who could be lawfully targeted. Under Biden, the standard focused on senior operatives; under the Hegseth framework, sustained airstrikes against lower-level fighters became standard practice. The West Point CTC noted that the average assessed death toll per strike in the early months of 2025 was roughly 1.4 militants, substantially below the 2023 average of 6.1 per strike, suggesting a broadened targeting profile rather than precision operations against high-value individuals.

Al-Shabaab's Territorial Gains and the Humanitarian Data Blackout

The military rationale for the campaign is that it degrades al-Shabaab's capacity to threaten the US homeland and its allies. The operational evidence, however, points in a different direction. According to Semafor, the group has successfully repelled recent offensives by Somalia's national army, recapturing key territories previously liberated during the government's 2022 to 2023 campaigns. Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate with an estimated 7,000 to 12,000 fighters, controls large swaths of Somalia's south-central regions and continues to press towards Mogadishu.

The secondary US target in the campaign is ISIS-Somalia, a smaller group based in the cave complexes of the Golis Mountains in Puntland. The group, which split from al-Shabaab in 2015, had grown from roughly 300 fighters in 2019 to approximately 1,500 by May 2025, according to AFRICOM's own assessments. Around 60 per cent of that number are reportedly foreign fighters, which US officials cite as the justification for framing Somalia as a potential homeland threat.

The civilian impact of the campaign remains almost entirely unquantifiable. AFRICOM's casualty reporting blackout, described by Amnesty International's crisis research head Brian Castner as a 'smokescreen for impunity,' has effectively severed independent oversight.

A 2023 letter signed by 24 Somali and international rights organisations and addressed to the Secretary of Defense stated that civilian victims 'have yet to receive answers, acknowledgement, and amends despite their sustained efforts to reach authorities over several years.' That accountability gap has only widened since.

The Council on Foreign Relations noted in a March 2026 assessment that the Trump administration's stated security strategy for Africa explicitly aims to avoid 'long-term American presence or commitments,' relying instead on sustained airpower as a low-risk substitute for ground engagement. Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reinforced that arrangement in early 2025, when he offered Trump 'exclusive operational control' over air bases in Berbera and Baledogle, as well as the ports of Berbera and Bosaso, in a letter to the White House reported by the Associated Press.

With al-Shabaab gaining ground despite 58 publicly confirmed strikes this year, the question is no longer whether the US bombing campaign in Somalia is record-breaking, but whether it is working.